Falcons against the Jihad : Israeli Airpower and Coercive Diplomacy in Southern Lebanon

By Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., USAF

Book Id: WPLBN0002170713
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.4 MB
Reproduction Date: 10/22/2012

Title:	Falcons against the Jihad : Israeli Airpower and Coercive Diplomacy in Southern Lebanon
Author:	Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., USAF
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, Military Science, War
Collections:	Authors Community, United States
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Air University Press

Member Page:	Air University Press
Citation APA MLA Chicago Colonel Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., Usa, B. L. (n.d.). Falcons against the Jihad : Israeli Airpower and Coercive Diplomacy in Southern Lebanon. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.us/

Description
During the Lebanon conflict, the Israeli Air Force(IAF) employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations.

Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE LEBANON PERIOD . . . . . 3 Israeli Objectives . . . . . 3 Airpower’s Role . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 7 3 THE ISRAELI STRATEGY . . . . . 9 Defining the Israeli Strategy . . . . . 9 The Israeli Airpower Strategy . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . 13 The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security . . . . 13 Hizbollah and the PLO . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 5 EFFECTIVENESS OF IAF REPRISAL RAIDS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 19 6 WHY THE AIR STRIKES FAILED . . . . 21 Asymmetry of Motivation . . . . 22 Inability to Create Fear of Unacceptable Escalation . . . . 23 Lebanon Environment . . . . 23 Israeli Air Strikes Could Not Increase Costs on Attackers 24 Notes . . . . . 25 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 27 Summary of Findings . . . . . 27 Key Lessons . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29