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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix A HISTORY OF DIVISION AND CONFLICT . . . .1 THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA ACCELERATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 DENY FLIGHT: THE DETERRENT USE OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE . . . . . . . . . 31 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . .43 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 THE USAF TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 FRAMING THE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 THE CURRENT FIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Irregular Warfare: Winning the Long War . . . 6 Air Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Strategic Communication: Spreading the Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Culture and Language in the Expeditionary Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distributed Planning: The Key to Centralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Unmanned Aerial Systems: The Air Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Intelligence Reform: The Secondary Effects of Merging Intelligence with Surveillance and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 The Total Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Air Base Disaster Planning: Contingency Operations . . . . . . ....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 THE COLD WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Strategic Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 General Curtis E. LeMay (1906–90) . . . . . . 17 Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (1900–86) . . . . 22 3 THE WEAPON SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Tanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile-ICBM . .68 The Cruise Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine SSBN. . 72 SAC Alert Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Boomer Patrol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4 FUN, GAMES, AND SERIOUS BUSINESS . . . .93 Combat Crew Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 SAC Bombing Competition . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Spot Promotions . . . . ...

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This publication consists of a series of lectures prepared and given to interns and other employees by Mr. David G. Boak in 1966. Mr. Boak is uniquely qualified to discuss the history of the US COM_SEC because he has participated significantly in most aspects of its modern development over the past twenty years....

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This study answers the following questions: Is John A. Warden III’s, “The Enemy as a System” analogous to the Air Corps Tactical School’s (ACTS) industrial web theory of airpower employment? If so, why (given the 50 plus years between development of these theories)? If not, what are the prime sources of divergence? The author first describes both theories using an outline from which they are compared on an “apples to apples” basis. From this analysis, similarities and differences are presented. Next, the author discusses contextual factors affecting development of both theories....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 THEORY DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPARISON . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 15 3 ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 30 4 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 36 GLOSSARY . . . . 37...

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Control of the vertical dimension—air and space—is essential to preserving healthy commerce and situational awareness during peacetime and sustaining military operations during conflict. Air and space forces must be integrated in order to achieve rapid dominance of the battle space when necessary. While airpower has existed for almost a century, military space operations are yet in their infancy. Military leaders, planners, and operators are just beginning to recognize the importance and legitimacy of space as a center of gravity and war-fighting medium....

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This study examines the links between science, philosophy, and military theory. The author uses two case studies to demonstrate the links between these disciplines. He presents an overview on the rise of Newtonian science, and he examines how the key frameworks and concepts of that science became interwoven into Western civilization to affect its philosophy with an emphasis on its interpretation by the German Romanticist philosopher Immanuel Kant. He then shows how Newtonian science and Kant’s philosophy affected the military theory of Carl von Clausewitz. His second case study concerns the theory and philosophy of evolution developed by British philosopher Herbert Spencer and its influence on the military theory of J. F. C. Fuller. The author compares these two case studies to find commonalities between them that suggest a mechanism which explains how and why scientific theory and their philosophical interpretations eventually influence military theory. The author then uses this mechanism as a tool with which “new” sciences such as quantum mechanics, relativity, and complexity theory can be evaluated to see if and in what manner t...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE RISE OF NEWTONIAN SCIENCE . . . . . 5 KANT . . . . 15 CLAUSEWITZ . . . . 21 SPENCER AND FULLER . . . . . 29 THE PATH FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY TO MILITARY THEORY . . . . 39 THE NEW SCIENCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY THEORY . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 59...

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To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison’s three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 METHODOLOGY . . . . 3 Jointnesss . . . . 3 Allison’s Models . . . . 4 Observations . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . 9 3 THE UNITED STATES NAVY . . . . . . 11 Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement . . . . 11 Analysis . . . . . 15 Joint Operations . . . . 19 Notes . . . . 19 4 THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS . . . . . . 21 Marine Air Operations . . . . . . 21 Analysis . . . . . 29 Joint Operations . . . . 34 Notes . . . . 34 5 THE UNITED STATES ARMY . . . . . . 37 Battlefield Preparation . . . . . . 37 Analysis . . . . . 47 Joint Operations . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 50 6 THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . . . . . . 55 Deep Strike Coordination . . . . . 55 Analysis . . . . . 64 Joint Operations . . . . 66 Notes . . . . 66 7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . 69 Command . . . . 70 Doctrine . . . . . 70 Command Location . . . . . 72 CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders . . . . . . 75 Information . . . . . . 77 Joint Force Integration . . . . . . 78 USAF/US Army Command Alignment . . . . 79 Summary . . . . . 81 Notes . . . . 81...

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Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power theory. Early air power theorists argued that one could defeat the enemy by paralyzing his war-making and war-sustaining capabilities—a form of economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. In contrast, Boyd and Warden contend thatone should target enemy command and control—that is, control warfare based upon command targeting....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 THE NOTION OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 BOYD’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . 20 WARDEN’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . 30 CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI REVISITED . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37 BOYD, WARDEN, AND THE EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER THEORY . . . . 39 The Past—Paralysis by Economic Warfare and Industrial Targeting . . . . 39 The Present—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Command Targeting . . . . 41 The Future—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Informational Targeting . . . . 42 Notes . . . . . 44 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

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This paper proposes two broad modifications to concepts and cultures to embed Effects Based Operations (EBO) at the critical nexus of the tactical and operational levels of war. Services, as part of the joint community, must narrowly define EBO in a quantifiable, measurable realm. The USAF needs to solve its tactical training/operational campaigning dichotomy by moving toward capabilities-based training. The services should stop clinging to the antiquated concept of separate and distinct levels of war with minimal similarities where no clear distinction actually exists. These small steps will build synergy between the execution of national policy and the planning that enables it. Such synergy may then aid the evolution toward the seamless continuum necessary for an EBO culture to thrive....

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In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

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In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question of whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare in the twenty-first century.

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This study examines the development of military night aviation from its origins through the First World War. Emphasis is on the evolution of night flying in those countries which fought on the Western Front, namely France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States . While night flying occurred in other theaters, the most intense air effort was clearly in t°he west. There, belligerents pressed aviation technology and tactics to the limits ; the skies of northern France and Flanders offered the only opportunity for movement across the stagnated front. Another important consideration was the availability of rich documentation concerning night aerial activity in the theater....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

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The early proponents of air power believed that with suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant. In the years since they made these predictions, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by early advocates. However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results their predecessors promised. Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority....

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This paper examines how these rules affected the effective military execution of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, as well as their impact on American aircrews and the enemy. During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs became so complicated and changed so often that aircrews found it difficult to know what the rules were from day to day. As a result, many vital military targets were either not bombed or were attacked in a very limited and piecemeal fashion....

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1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32...