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...In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush declared the dawn of a new kind of war. He has repeatedly emphasized that means and measures of success in this new war will differ greatly from wars past. However, if this “war on terrorism” is unlike any other war, then what is it like? From the public state...

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...ORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THREATS FROM WITHOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 THREATS FROM WITHIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 REDEFINING WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33...

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...Accounts of seizing the tactical or operational initiative abound. At the strategic level of war, however, initiative receives only transitory mention. Authors and military professionals often assume a common understanding of strategic initiative, including which combatant has it and why. There is neither a clear def...

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...1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45 . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 3 THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4 CONCLUSION . . . . . ...

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...This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the changing nature of terrorism itself and develops an analytical framework within which to assess the strategies of terrorist groups. It compares the strategies of old terrorist groups—Red Army...

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...io is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio...

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... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 SAC Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Cold War Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 The Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 They Also Served . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 5 BEYOND THE CALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 6 THE SOVIET C...

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...m, today’s military can learn lessons from historical small wars and low intensity conflicts to train and employ forces effectively to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global insurgents and their ability to win popular support. This paper employs a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945–60) and Vietnam (1964–72), to illuminate my thesis....

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...ions about naval and air force traditional roles. Though this initially unappreciated weapon gained considerable acceptance during the years of World War II, mines were not again dropped from aircraft in combat until the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force gave little effort to its collateral maritime missions until concern grew over containing an expandin...

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...1. MINE WARFARE..................3 Theory and History Mines and How They Worked 2. WORLD WAR II AERIAL MINELAYING IN EUROPE............7 First Use by Germany The Royal Air Force Fights Back 3. MINELAY’ING IN JAPAN’S "OUTER ZONE" -1942-1945............10 Early Plans and Capability U.S. Navy Submarine and Surf...

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...In his book The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II, Charles Griffith makes a major contribution in detailing the role played by General Hansell from his early days as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School to the heady days and nights as a young war planner dev...

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.... . . . . . . . . 53 3 PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4 THE FRICTIONS OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 5 THE GLOBAL BOMBER FORCE . . . . . . . . .129 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 TRIUMPH . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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...Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political...

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...When the Cold War set off a prolonged arms race and space competition with the Soviet Union, this well-educated cadre of the greatest generation was ready to provide the technical and managerial expertise needed to meet the Soviet challeng...

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... PART II Air Power as an Element of US Power Projection Page Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Air Power since World War II: Consistent with Doctrine? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Dr Williamson Murray Aerospace Forces and Power Projection . . . 115 Lt Gen Michael A . Nelson, USAF The Relevance of High-Intensity Op...

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...hen examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting a...

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...Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 The War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 4 By the Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 5 Civilian Damage in Lebanon . . . . . . .75 6 Targeting for Effect . . . . . . . . . . .105 7 ...

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...rotraction and Prolongation of Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Karl P. Magyar Iran-Iraq: Protracted Conflict, Prolonged War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 M. A. Shahriar Shirkhani and Constantine P. Danopoulos The Longevity of the Lebanese Civil War . . .41 As’ad AbuKhalil The Arab-Israeli Wars: A Confli...

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...Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1...

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...planner. By merging the lessons of the past with current and future trends, one can achieve immediate results and dramatically affect the out-come of war....

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...1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 UNLIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . 3 Summary . . . . . 10 3 LIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . . 11 Summary . . . . . 15 4 HYPERWAR AND THE FUTURE . . . . . 17 Summary . . . . . 27 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...