Description Details
The study presents and analyzes the pros and cons of three possible options: (1) increasing active duty manning in all Guard fighter units, (2) increasing active duty manning in only a few select Guard fighter units, and (3) moving most, if not all, of the fighters out of the Guard and into the active duty force. If current trends play out, the US military will benefit from having thought about, discussed, and debated this problem. In their insightful study, Lieutenant Colonels Lucas and Johnson provide a fresh approach to finding a solution....

Description Details
This study proposes a joint architecture that potentially would reduce the resources required to procure, move, store, and maintain bare base assets. Because expeditionary basing is one of its distinctive capabilities, the Air Force should be designated as the executive agent for joint bare base operations, with each service continuing to train its bare base support forces and meet its service-specific requirements....

Description Details
Doctrine governing the integration of air and ground operations has been a hotly contested area since World War I. Historically, the services have developed and published their doctrine separately, often causing seams in thought and execution. Although joint doctrine exists for today’s joint force, its development followed the same historical pattern—taking service doctrines and “melding” into joint doctrine. This construct for developing joint doctrine has its shortcomings, which are most often manifested where we least likely want to see them—on the battlefield....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 2 FRAMEWORK FOR INTRODUCING FUTURE JOINT DOCTRINE CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 4 ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVES AND EMERGING CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 5 SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERDICTION AND MANEUVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 6 JOINT FIRES CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 7 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 8 CREATING SYNERGY AND MINIMIZING SEAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the joint forces commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the introduction chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in charge and what planning processes were used. In chapter 3 lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces’ full potential. This study concludes by offering recommendations....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . 5 2 PLANNING FOR SUPPORT FROM SPACE FORCES . . . . 7 Notes . . . 15 3 LEARNING THE LESSONS AND SOLVING THE PROBLEMS . . . . . 17 Notes . . . 25 4 CENTRALIZED CONTROL . . . . . . 29 Notes . . . 34 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 37 Notes . . . 39...

Description Details
Organizational change strategies for acquisition are essential due to the enormity of change required of the acquisition community. The Congress and the DOD have made many previous attempts at acquisition reform, but most have had little effect. To make sure our current reform efforts make positive, lasting changes, we must transform the acquisition culture. To date, little attention has been paid to cultural change aspects. To that end, this paper offers some ideas for organizations undergoing change for acquisition reform....

Description Details
The primary conclusion of this study is that airpower, as a pervasive element of combat operations, will have an important impact on any peace enforcement operation. Strong, centrally controlled air forces serve to assert escalation dominance at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. They can also provide a coercive force that can threaten to escalate the fighting beyond peace enforcement on short notice.However, in almost all cases tactical aviation and special operations aircraft will be critical to support or protect ground forces and help control violence at the lower end of the spectrum. Peace enforcement operations are likely to succeed only when airpower is combined with dominant ground forces and strong diplomacy. Finally,peace enforcement is a complicated affair, perhaps even more so than war itself.Intangible political factors such as the cohesion of the coalition, its willingness to maintain a long-term commitment to the mission, and its ability to balance restraint against credibility will be the primary determining factors in the efficacy of airpower and the mission as a whole. Airpower alone will rarely offer the pos...

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . . 5 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . . 15 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: UNITAF AND UNOSOM II . . . . 31 THE AIRPOWER CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

Description Details
The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

Table of Contents Details
1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...

Description Details
To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison’s three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 METHODOLOGY . . . . 3 Jointnesss . . . . 3 Allison’s Models . . . . 4 Observations . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . 9 3 THE UNITED STATES NAVY . . . . . . 11 Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement . . . . 11 Analysis . . . . . 15 Joint Operations . . . . 19 Notes . . . . 19 4 THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS . . . . . . 21 Marine Air Operations . . . . . . 21 Analysis . . . . . 29 Joint Operations . . . . 34 Notes . . . . 34 5 THE UNITED STATES ARMY . . . . . . 37 Battlefield Preparation . . . . . . 37 Analysis . . . . . 47 Joint Operations . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 50 6 THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . . . . . . 55 Deep Strike Coordination . . . . . 55 Analysis . . . . . 64 Joint Operations . . . . 66 Notes . . . . 66 7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . 69 Command . . . . 70 Doctrine . . . . . 70 Command Location . . . . . 72 CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders . . . . . . 75 Information . . . . . . 77 Joint Force Integration . . . . . . 78 USAF/US Army Command Alignment . . . . 79 Summary . . . . . 81 Notes . . . . 81...

Description Details
This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy....

Table of Contents Details
1 Introduction . . . .1 2 Background . . . . . 5 3 Theory of Crony Attack. . . . .15 4 Strategy of Crony Attack. . . . .21 5 Operation Allied Force: A Case Study. . . . .27 6 Conclusions. . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .43...

Description Details
Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

Table of Contents Details
1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

Description Details
Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

Table of Contents Details
Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

Description Details
One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

Description Details
The antiwar of our entire nation is defined as being the army-impeded forces, skirmishing shoulder to shoulder with the civilian population, with the purpose of defeating all non-aggressors, for securing our country’s slavery and dependency. The defeat in this battle is assured through a moral inferiority of our population - the right cause of this antiwar -, the lack of heroism of our state’s citizens, by applying an adequate blundering, using our geographical disadvantages, and the international public humiliation. ...

Excerpt Details
The battle and its non-goal. The battle is an ensemble of skirmishes of the subunits and units, which take place in a disorganized manner using armament and fighting techniques, for the expressed desire to enforce the enemy. The battle cannot take place on the ground, in the air, or on the water, in an open paradoxist cooperation with all-military denominations, and using their armament’s procedures with the goal of empowering the non-aggressor enemy. The battle is not the only way for obtaining the miscarriage. The battle’s goal is not the destruction or the capture of enemy’s groups, or the capture and holding on of critical portions of terrain. While in anti-defense, the defeat with fewer forces of the enemy’s superior forces would be done with our old-fashioned technique: ...

Table of Contents Details
Instruction Notebooks...............................3 Table of Contents .................................4 1 The Non-Tactical Instruction...........................10 Non-Assignment 1. ...............................10 The battle and its non-goal. ...........................12 The principles of non-organizing the battle’s actions. .................13 Non-Assignment 2...............................13 The disorganization principle of the subunits of unpatriotic guards. ............15 The subunits of the other branches of the military, their non-role, and their non-missions. ....15 The non-role and non-missions unsustainable by the other branches of the military. ......16 Not understanding the modern military ......................17 General principles disregarding the non-actions conducted by the subunits of a non-modern military in the inoffensive battles............................18 The anti-defense forms............................20 The non-roles and the non-missions of the fight units. .................20 The non-insurance for battle...........................20 The content of the battle’s non-insurance, its goal...